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Research Articles
ViEWS: A political violence
early-warning system
Håvard Hegrea,b , Marie Allanssona, Matthias Basedaua,d,
Michael Colaresia,c, Mihai Croicua, Hanne Fjeldea , Frederick Hoylesa, Lisa Hultmana,
Stina Ho¨gbladha, Remco Jansena, Naima Mouhleba, Sayyed AuwnMuhammada, Desire´e Nilssona ,
Håvard Mokleiv Nygårda,b, Gudlaug Olafsdottira, Kristina Petrovaa, David Randahla,
Espen Geelmuyden Røda, Gerald Schneidera,e, Nina von Uexkulla, and Jonas Vestbyb
Abstract
This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly
available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives.
ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three
UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article
presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected
forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of
constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research
literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a
persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in
Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to
accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread
of violence inCameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-
public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.
Keywords
Africa, armed conflict, forecasting
ViEWS: Guiding principles
Large-scale political violence kills thousands every month
across the globe and forces many more to relocate within
countries and across borders. Armed conflicts have dis-
astrous economic consequences, undermine the func-
tioning of political systems, prevent countries from
escaping dire poverty, and hinder humanitarian assis-
tance where most needed.
The challenges of preventing, mitigating, and adapt-
ing to large-scale political violence are particularly daunt-
ing when it escalates in locations and at times where it is
not expected. Policymakers and first responders would
benefit greatly from a system that systematically moni-
tors all locations at risk of conflict and assesses the prob-
ability of conflict onset, escalation, continuation, and
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geographic diffusion. This article presents ViEWS – a
political violence early-warning system— which seeks to
address this need. We outline the methodological frame-
work and evaluate the predictive performance of the
system as of 1 October 2018.
The forecasting task ViEWS has set out is multidi-
mensional. ViEWS provides forecasts 36 months into
the future for three types of political violence: armed
conflict involving states and rebel groups, armed conflict
between non-state actors, and violence against civilians
(Pettersson & Eck, 2018). The probability that political
violence occurs in a given month is forecasted for both
countries and subnational geographical units. This
means that ViEWS provides forecasts for continued con-
flict as well as new conflicts. To be useful as an early-
warning system, ViEWS has since June 2018 published
monthly updated forecasts for Africa at http://views.pcr.
uu.se/.1 This is made possible by the monthly release of
candidate events from the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP; see Hegre et al., 2018).
The ViEWS forecasts build on a number of constitu-
ent models drawing on insights from decades of quanti-
tative peace and conflict research. Some of the models are
thematic, concentrating on topics such as conflict his-
tory, the economy, political institutions, and geography.
Others are more general, combining multiple themes or
using information at the country and the subnational
level to generate forecasts. We subsequently combine the
forecasts from these individual models to ensembles. Our
evaluation shows that the ViEWS ensembles improve
forecasting of political violence at both the country and
the subnational level compared to multiple tough base-
line models.
The forecasts from October 2018 indicate that con-
flict will persist up to and beyond 2021 in several coun-
tries that have a recent history of political violence, such
as Burundi, Nigeria, and DR Congo. The system also
alerts to new conflicts in Southern Cameroon and
Northern Mozambique.
The aims of ViEWS are maximal transparency, uni-
form coverage, and public availability. Transparency
requires that the risk assessments can be traced back to
a fully specified argument and accessible information,
allowing readers and potential users to evaluate what lies
behind the forecasts. ViEWS is therefore exclusively
based on publicly available data. Moreover, its results,
input data, and procedures are available to researchers
and the international community. Uniform coverage of
the regions at risk helps to alert observers to locations
that receive insufficient attention. In principle, ViEWS
seeks to be able to issue a warning with equal probability
for any location independent of its geo-strategic impor-
tance, past conflict history, or current humanitarian sit-
uation. Public availability of the results is useful for
domestic actors and small international NGOs, and
essential to ensure transparency regarding decisions they
might make based on these results.
In the following, we first briefly review the litera-
ture that has informed ViEWS. Second, we outline
the methodological framework. Third, we evaluate the
performance of the system and present the ViEWS
forecasts from October 2018 to October 2021.
Finally, we discuss future extensions of the system
and conclude.
Literature review
Prediction has long been considered a core task for peace
research (Singer, 1973), and a comprehensive literature
review is beyond the scope of this article (rather, see
Schneider, Gleditsch & Carey, 2010; Hegre et al.,
2017). Conflict forecasting has taken a number of meth-
odological approaches, for example game theory (Bueno
de Mesquita, 2010), machine-learning tools such as
neural networks (Schrodt, 1991), and algorithms for
automatic coding of event data (Schrodt, Davis & Wed-
dle, 1994). Ward, Greenhill & Bakke (2010) arguably
represents a turning point, bringing prediction into the
mainstream of peace research.
ViEWS builds on innovations in the academic early-
warning systems for conflict that have been proposed
since the 1970s (Andriole & Young, 1977). The State
Failure/Political Instability Task Force (PITF) aimed to
forecast political crises two years in advance (Esty et al.,
1995; Gurr et al., 1999; Goldstone et al., 2010). A key
insight from PITF is that simplistic models with a few
powerful variables performed as well as complex models,
at least at the country-year level. The Integrated Crisis
Early Warning System (ICEWS) focused on a range of
domestic and international crises (O’Brien, 2010). Valu-
able insights from ICEWS include separate modelling of
conflict phases (onset, continuation, termination) and
the utility of a multimethod approach to forecasting.
As the literature has matured, real-time forecasts have
become increasingly common (Brandt, Freeman &
Schrodt, 2011; Ward & Beger, 2017). Some of these
are publicly available. For instance, the US Holocaust
Memorial Museum has a regular updated early-warning
1 Given sufficient funding to cover the required data-collection
needs, these ambitions will be scaled up to a wider geographic scale.
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system for mass atrocities (https://www.ushmm.org/con
front-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/early-warning-
project), and One Earth Future publishes monthly fore-
casts for military coups (CoupCast; http://oefresearch.
org/activities/coup-cast).
Some contributions have been particularly important
for ViEWS.We build on the pioneering work of Michael
Ward and his team (Montgomery, Hollenbach &Ward,
2012; Ward & Beger, 2017) using ensemble methods to
combine forecasts from unique thematic models. We
also adapt efforts to integrate structural factors with tem-
porally and spatially disaggregated event data that change
more swiftly (Weidmann & Ward, 2010; Chiba & Gle-
ditsch, 2017). Our evaluation builds on the introduction
of ROC curves to peace research (Ward, Greenhill &
Bakke, 2010), PR curves (O’Brien, 2002), Brier scores
(Brandt, Schrodt & Freeman, 2014), and separation
plots (Greenhill, Ward & Sacks, 2011; Colaresi & Mah-
mood, 2017). We also use the random forest algorithm
(Breiman, 2001) which has been shown to be effective in
our domain (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017).
Finally, ViEWS would not have been possible with-
out the extensive substantive research on armed conflict
(see Buhaug, Levy & Urdal, 2014; Gleditsch, Metter-
nich & Ruggeri, 2014; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006, for
reviews). ViEWS has greatly benefited from civil war
studies conducted at the country level (e.g. Muller &
Weede, 1990; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), but also from
the geographically disaggregated studies initiated in the
early 2000s (Buhaug & Gates, 2002; Buhaug, Cederman
& Red, 2008; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009), made
possible by the geo-coded events data (Raleigh et al.,
2010; Sundberg & Melander, 2013).
Methodology
To address its forecasting task, ViEWS is organized
into smaller subtasks following a ‘divide and conquer’
strategy detailed in this section. We describe how we
analyze three outcomes separately at two levels of analy-
sis, and eventually combine all models using ensembles
to produce the ViEWS forecast. The workflow for each
monthly update is sketched in Figure 1. All steps in this
process are automatized as a set of SQL and Python 3.x
scripts. Data are handled on a dedicated server,
whereas most model training and simulation is run
on a high-performance computing cluster. Further
methodological details and additional results are in an
Online appendix, the sections of which are referred to
as ‘Appendix [no.]’.
Levels of analysis
ViEWS generates forecasts at two levels of analysis:
country-months (Gleditsch &Ward, 1999, abbreviated
cm), and subnational geographical location months
(pgm). The cm level is useful for predictions of new
conflicts where no known actors exist, and to model
processes at the government level. The set of countries
is defined as in Gleditsch & Ward (1999), and the
geographical extent of countries by CShapes (Weid-
mann, Kuse & Gleditsch, 2010). For the subnational
forecasts, ViEWS relies on the PRIO-GRID (version
2.0; Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012), a standardized
structure consisting of quadratic grid cells that cover all
areas of the world at a resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal
degrees. More details on the levels of analysis are in
Appendix B.1.
The outcomes we predict: Conflict data
ViEWS generates predictions for the three forms of
organized violence coded by the UCDP (Melander,
Pettersson & Themne´r, 2016): state-based conflict
(sb), one-sided violence against civilians (os), and non-
state conflict (ns).2 We are convinced that an early-
warning system benefits from distinguishing between
these forms of violence. They are related, but also dis-
tinct: democracies see less armed conflict (Hegre et al.,
2001), but rebel groups fighting democratic govern-
ments are more likely to target civilians than those fight-
ing autocrats (Eck & Hultman, 2007). Non-state
conflicts are much more responsive to climatic factors
than state-based conflicts (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012).
As ViEWS improves its thematic models, these distinc-
tions are important to maintain.
We focus primarily on state-based conflicts here to
simplify presentation. sb conflicts are more numerous
than os and ns, and have been studied more extensively.
A large share of os and ns events are also outcomes of
state-based conflicts: much of the violence against civi-
lians is perpetrated by governments and rebel groups to
weaken opponents, and much non-state conflict is in-
fighting between rebel groups that also are in conflict
with the government.
Conflict data are obtained from UCDP-GED and
take the form of events (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).
Historical data covering 1989–2017 are extracted from
the UCDP GED version 18.1 (Croicu & Sundberg,
2013; Allansson, Melander & Themne´r, 2017;
2 See Melander, Pettersson & Themne´r (2016) and https://www.pcr.
uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ for detailed definitions.
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Pettersson & Eck, 2018).3 Newer data are provided by
the new UCDP-Candidate dataset which is updated
monthly (see Hegre et al., 2018, and Appendix B.2 for
details regarding definitions and aggregation). These
updates enable using data on conflict up to one month
before the forecasting window. Here, we use data includ-
ing August 2018. The UCDP-Candidate data are in the
form of ‘candidate events’. Many UCDP definitions (see
Gleditsch et al., 2002) are applicable only on a per
calendar-year basis, and the final UCDP-GED dataset
can only be compiled after the end of the year. The
UCDP-Candidate events dataset consequently relaxes
the UCDP requirement of 25 battle-related deaths in a
calendar year for a conflict to be recorded, as well as the
requirement of a ‘stated goal of incompatibility’. The
very strict requirements in terms of known and clear
parties to the conflict are also relaxed as long as there are
sufficiently strong indications that events have a high
likelihood of inclusion in the final UCDP datasets.
UCDP and ViEWS have developed a coding procedure
with a goal of making the monthly candidate events as
close in content to the final dataset as possible.
The statistical models constituting ViEWS
The models in ViEWS (summarized in Table I) are
designed to complement each other. As of October
2018, ViEWS has specified two extensive and six the-
matic core models at the cm level. At the pgm level there
are ten core models – five thematic, two combined
themes, and three with country-level predictors. We use
three different estimation strategies for each of these core
models. We combine these models in ensembles to pro-
duce the ViEWS forecasts – 24 models in the cm ensem-
bles, and 30 in pgm. We estimate the same ensembles of
models for each of the three outcomes (sb, ns, and os).
Table II lists the models at the cm level. Detailed
descriptions of the predictors can be found in Appendix
A, and estimation results are available in Jansen et al.
(2018). Figure 2 shows maps of the predicted probabil-
ities for a subset of the models. These refer to at least one
event in a country month for sb conflict, October 2018.
Figure 1. The ViEWS system and monthly process flow in six steps
Steps: (1) collect data from various sources; (2) transform data to the six main ViEWS levels, store in database (see Appendix K); (3) create
individual datasets for each model, manipulate data as needed; (4) estimate models, create forecasts for each of them via one-step-ahead or
dynasim; (5) calibrate and compute ensemble forecasts; (6) publish results and/or evaluate and improve ensemble. pg/pgy/pgm: PRIO-GRID,
-year, -month. c/cy/cm: Country, -year, -month.
3 The UCDP-GED raw data are publicly available through the
UCDP-GED API (Croicu & Sundberg, 2013). Automatic fetching
of data using API is described in http://ucdp.uu.se/apidocs/.
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Countries with red color have predicted probabilities
close to 1, whereas blue and purple countries have prob-
abilities at less than 0.01. Orange means a predicted
probability of 0.5.
The baseline model (not mapped) uses the average
proportion of months with conflict in a country over the
1990–2014 period as a single predictor. The conflict
history theme represents the more recent record of con-
flict events. As is shown in Figure 2a, the predictions for
this model reflect recent violence in for instance Nigeria,
DRC, and Mali. The demography, economy, institu-
tional, and protest themes capture elements from the
peace research literature. Figure 3 shows that the demo-
graphy model yields somewhat heightened predicted
probabilities for populous countries and countries with
low education rates (Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Thyne,
2006). The economics model (2c) suggests more conflict
in poor or oil-producing countries with low economic
growth (Collier, Hoeffler & So¨derbom, 2004; Fearon &
Laitin, 2003). The institutional model (2d) assigns high
risk to countries that are non-democratic, exclude large
minorities from political power, and with recent regime
changes (Hegre et al., 2001; Cederman, Hug & Krebs,
2010; Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). The protest
model (2e) captures that protest can be a precursor to
armed conflict, as it was in Syria in 2011 and Burundi in
2015. Escalation can be especially likely when the gov-
ernment responds with violence (Tilly, 1978). The map
shows that the protest theme overall assigns relatively
high probability of conflict throughout Africa, but lower
in a handful of peaceful countries, among them Zambia
and Botswana. However, the protest theme also assigns
low probabilities to conflict-prone countries such as the
Central African Republic and Chad. The final dimension
of model variation relates to estimation strategy and han-
dling of dynamics (cf. Table I and sections ‘Model esti-
mation’ and ‘Handling forecasting dynamics’ below).
Figure 2f shows predictions from the demography model
Table II. cm (country-level) models
Baseline
Proportion of months in training period with conflict
Conflict history theme
Lagged conflict (sb, ns, os)
Decay functions (2m=12 where m is the number of months
without conflict and 12 months the half-life parameter;
sb, ns, os)
Demography theme
Population size
Proportion of population between 15 and 24 with at least
lower secondary education
Proportion of population living in urban areas
Economy theme
GDP per capita, oil rents only
GDP per capita, excluding oil rents
Growth in GDP per capita, oil rents only
Growth in GDP per capita, excluding oil rents
Institutions theme
Democracy
Semi-democracy
Time since pre-independence war
Time since regime change
Proportion of population excluded from power
Time since independence
Protest theme
Lagged protest
Decay functions (2m=12 where m is the number of months
without protest and 12 months the half-life parameter)
All themes
Baseline þ Conflict history þ
Demography þ Economy þ Institutions
All themes þ protest
Baseline þ Conflict history þ
Demography þ Economy þ Institutions þ Protests
‘All themes’ and ‘All themes þ protest’ specifications are separated
because protest data only exist for a limited time period.
Table I. Overview of models, and abbreviations, used in the
ViEWS ensemble
Model group
definition Group Notes
Levels of analysis cm Country-month level
pgm PRIO-GRID-month
level
Outcomes sb State-based conflict
os One-sided violence
ns Non-state conflict
Predictor
aggregation
Thematic, no
cross-level
representation
6 themes at cm and 4 at
pgm levels. See Tables
II and III
All themes, no
cross-level
representation
One variant with
protests, one without
pgm level only
All themes and
cross-level
representation
Handling of
dynamics
and estimation
strategy
Dynamic
simulation
See section ‘Dynamic
simulation’
One-step ahead
logit
One-step ahead
random forest
See Tables II and III and Appendix A for a list of predictors. Full
estimation results for all models are provided in Jansen et al. (2018).
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produced when estimating a one-step-ahead random for-
est model. Comparing 2b and 2f we see a much stronger
discrimination between high and low risk countries in 2f,
even though the same predictors enter both models. For
all models, the one-step-ahead random forests tend to
give sharper predictions compared to dynamic simula-
tion and one-step-ahead logits.
Table III summarizes the ViEWS models at the pgm
level, and their prediction maps are shown in Figure 3.
As for the cm level, the baseline uses the proportion of
months with conflict for each PRIO-GRID cell as a
predictor. The conflict history theme captures recent
events in a cell and its neighbors. As shown in Figure
3a, conflict history yields specific and sharp predicted
locations of conflict in October 2018.
We have defined two themes with relatively static geo-
graphical predictors, one for natural features and one for
social ones. Figure 3b shows that the natural geography
model indicates an elevated risk of conflict in areas that are
attractive for human habitation, and areas such as those in
Angola, Namibia, and Botswana that are close to diamond
and oil extraction sites (Le Billon, 2001; Lujala, Gleditsch
& Gilmore, 2005). The prediction from the social
geography theme in 3c highlights the risk in highly popu-
lated or low-income areas, as well as locations with politi-
cally excluded ethnic groups, close to borders, or far from
capitals (Raleigh&Hegre, 2009; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala,
2009; Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). Figure 3d shows the
predictions from the protest theme. The theme assigns
higher probabilities to countries such as Tunisia, Burundi,
Rwanda, and a number of countries in Western Africa.
We have also specified a number of large models that
include all the thematic predictors. Figure 3e shows the
predictions from amodel including history, natural geogra-
phy, and social geography aswell as cm level predictors.This
large model pulls up the predicted probabilities for loca-
tions in countries that the cmmodels indicate are relatively
high risk (e.g. Angola and Zimbabwe), and pulls down
probabilities for countries like Namibia and Botswana.
Finally, Figure 3f shows a model containing the same
predictors as 3e but modelled using one-step-ahead
random forests instead of dynamic simulation. When
Figure 2. Country-level sb forecasts for October 2018, selected constituent models
Figures a–e generated using logit models and dynamic simulation (ds); Figure f using random forests.
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comparing 3e and 3f, we see that the random forest
model provides smaller areas with high predicted prob-
ability of conflict than the dynamic simulation model.
Data sources for predictors
Complete references to the data sources are in Appendix
A. The most important sources are PRIO-GRID
(Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012), the World Devel-
opment Indicators (World Bank, 2015), data on politi-
cally excluded ethnic groups (Cederman, Wimmer &
Min, 2010), demographic factors (Lutz et al., 2007),
protests from ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010), and data
on institutions from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2011).
Model estimation
ViEWS relies on logistic regression and random forestmod-
els. The logit model is a generalized linear model (GLM)
that performs well compared to many machine-learning
techniques (Ge´ron, 2017). The random forest model (Brei-
man, 2001; Muchlinski et al., 2016) is a machine-learning
technique based on a combination of classification and
regression trees (CART), bootstrap-aggregating (bagging),
and random feature selection. Because random forest mod-
els are computationally intensive, we estimate them using a
‘downsampled’ dataset which includes all conflict events
and a random sample of non-events. See Appendixes C.1
and D.1 for more details.
Handling forecasting dynamics
ViEWS employs two alternative strategies to compute
forecasts for each of s 2 ð1; ::; 36Þ months into the
future. We call these dynamic simulation (ds) and one-
step-ahead (osa).
Dynamic simulation. The dynamic simulation (Dyna-
sim) procedure builds on Hegre et al. (2013) and Hegre
et al. (2016), and is discussed at length there.4 The
Figure 3. PRIO-GRID level sb forecasts for October 2018, selected constituent models
Figures a–e generated using logit models and dynamic simulation (ds); Figure f using random forests.
4 The first author’s original script ‘PRIOsim’ was rewritten in C# and
Cþþ by Joakim Karlsen. The Python routine underlying the current
projects is based on the ‘Dynasim’ reimplementation of this, written
by Jonas Vestby and Frederick Hoyles.
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procedure involves simulating model parameters based
on the estimated coefficients and the variance-covariance
matrix from a model. In addition, we compute predicted
probabilities for the outcomes for the first month t , draw
outcomes, and recalculate the history variables so that
the input predictor matrix Xtþ1 at t þ 1 reflects that
draw. This is repeated for each month s in the forecasting
window, and for each simulated set of parameters.
If we are interested in forecasting two months into the
forecasting period, we first train the constituent models,
estimate the weights, and produce our ensemble one-
month-ahead forecast. To produce forecasts for the next
month, we need the input predictor matrices X ðkÞtþ1: For
many constituent models, these input predictors will
themselves be functions of actual conflict (e.g. lagged
conflict indicators, time since last conflict, spatial dis-
tance to nearest conflict). Since these do not exist for
the next month (after the training window), we use the
prediction as the probability of an unobserved predictor,
for example for conflict at time t þ 1, when forecasting
conflict at t þ 2. A simulated value is drawn from this
probability, and recorded within a new simulated set of
predictors *X ðkÞtþ1.
The predictions for the three outcomes are obtained
simultaneously within each time step. For each of these,
we compute the predicted probability at t þ 1 as a func-
tion of information available at t , including the status for
the other two outcomes. This procedure repeats for every
month to the end of the forecasting window.
‘One-step-ahead’ modeling. In the one-step-ahead
modeling, we predict each step into the future (t þ 1,
( . . . ), t þ 12, ( . . . ) t þ 36) independently, as opposed
to dynamic simulation which moves forward sequen-
tially. We do this by estimating a set of models of the
form fs ðXtsÞ where s denotes the number of months
into the future to forecast. In regression notation these
take the form ytþs ¼ Xtt ; for s 2 ð1; 36Þ. The one-
step-ahead mode does this by time-shifting the right-
hand side variables with respect to the outcome before
models are trained, making the model a link function
between the future (ytþs) and the present (Xt ).
Table III. pgm (PRIO-GRID level) models
Baseline
Proportion of months in training period with conflict
Conflict history theme
Lagged conflict event (sb, ns, os)
Months since last conflict (decay function 2m=12; sb, ns, os)
Spatial lag of lagged conflict event (sb, ns, os)
Natural geography theme
Distance to nearest secondary diamonds resource
Distance to nearest petroleum resource
Proportion of mountainous terrain
Agricultural area
Barren area
Forest area
Shrublands
Pasture land
Urban areas
Social geography theme
Distance to neighboring country
Travel time to nearest city
Distance to capital city
Population size
Gross cell product
Infant mortality rate
Number of excluded groups
Country-level (cm) theme
Democracy
Semi-democracy
Time since independence
Time since pre-independence war
Time since regime change
Proportion of population excluded
GDP per capita, oil rents only
GDP per capita, excluding oil rents
Growth in GDP per capita, oil rents only
Growth in GDP per capita, excluding oil rents
Population size
Proportion of population between 15 and 24 with at least
lower secondary education
Proportion of population living in urban areas
Protest theme
Lagged protest
Months since last protest (decay function 2m=12)
Spatial lag of protest
All themes, without cm
Baseline þ Conflict history þ
Natural geography þ Social geography
All themes, with cm
In this model, predictions are either generated by (1) adding
the ‘cm theme’ variables to the ‘All themes, without cm’
model; or (2) multiplying predictions from the ‘All
themes, without cm’ model predictions obtained from
estimation at the pgm level with predictions from the ‘All
themes’ model estimated at the cm level. For details on
(2), see section on cross-level representation.
(continued)
Table III. (continued)
All themes, without cm þ protest
Baseline þ Conflict history þ
Natural geography þ Social geography þ Protest
‘All themes, without cm’ and ‘All themes, without cm þ protest’
specifications are separated because protest data only exist for a lim-
ited time period.
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Data partitioning and calibration
Table IV summarizes how we partition the data in
ViEWS. When evaluating our models, we need a
held-out test set for which we have observed conflict.
We call this the ‘evaluation periodization’. We use the
three most recent years for which we have final
UCDP-GED data as the test period – currently,
2015–17. When forecasting, the future is the test set.
In this case, we use all of our available data to train
and calibrate the forecasting models. We call this the
‘forecasting periodization’.5 For each of these two per-
iodizations, we partition our data into three periods:
one for estimating or training statistical models, one
for calibrating predicted probabilities from the mod-
els, and one for testing and forecasting.
All our models are initially estimated on the train-
ing period. Based on this estimation, we generate
predictions for each of the constituent models for the
calibration period. We use these to calibrate predicted
probabilities, and compute thresholds for cost-
function based metrics.6 Calibration of predicted
probabilities is especially useful as input to the ensem-
bles we describe in the next section. This entails
obtaining parameters that rescale predicted probabil-
ities so that the mean of predicted probability is sim-
ilar to the relative frequency of conflict in the data.
The details of the calibration procedure are described
in Appendix E.2.
With these hyper-parameters in hand, we retrain the
models using both the training and calibration periods
and generate predictions for the test period.7 These pre-
dictions are calibrated using the scaling parameters
obtained in the previous step.
Ensembles
The ViEWS forecasts are combinations of the constitu-
ent models in Tables II and III. Model combinations are
commonly referred to as ensembles, and have recently
been successfully applied to conflict forecasting
(Montgomery, Hollenbach & Ward, 2012; Ward &
Beger, 2017). Importantly, by drawing on the ‘wisdom
of the crowds’ of multiple models, they consistently pro-
duce more robust forecasts than individual models. In
addition, ensembles often improve overall predictive per-
formance by incorporating more information in forecasts
(Armstrong, 2001), and pooling indicators in thematic
models improves interpretability.
In ViEWS, the ensemble forecast probability p^ei for
observation i is currently the unweighted average predic-
tion from all K models:8
p^ei ¼
PK
k¼1
p^ki
K
The cm ensemble consists of the 8x3 models listed in
Table II (8 models estimated using dynamic simula-
tion, one-step-ahead logits, and random forests). More-
over, the pgm ensemble includes the 10x3 models listed
in Table III, again estimated in three different ways.
The full list of models and evaluation of each model
included in the ensembles is shown in Appendix sec-
tions G, H, and I.
Cross-level representation: Combining two levels
of analysis
The risk of conflict in a given location is influenced by
local factors as well as country-level factors. ViEWS aims
to make the two levels of analysis inform each other. Our
pgm model ensemble currently combines three
approaches. The first approach is to ignore cm factors.
The second is to add core cm variables to the pgm model
specification. This approach may be suboptimal, how-
ever, since it tends to spread the country-level risk evenly
out across the country’s territory. This may lead the
Table IV. Partitioning of data for forecasting, evaluation, and
estimating model weights
Periodization
Evaluation Forecast
Training period January 1990–
December 2011
January 1990–
August 2015
Calibration
period
January 2012–
December 2014
September 2015–
August 2018
Testing/
forecasting
period
January 2015–
December 2017
[September]October
2018–October 2021
5 Since we have new data every month and models are trained on all
data available at the first month of the forecasting window, the
periods are shifted monthly in a rolling pattern.
6 In future development, we will also use the calibration partition to
tune hyper-parameters such as tree depths in random forests, and
parameters such as the half-life of decay functions.
7 For instance, in the evaluation periodization the retraining is done
using data from 1990 through December 2014.
8 We have also explored the use of ensemble Bayesian model
averaging, but up to now this procedure does not yield consistently
better forecasts than the simple average. See Appendix D for details.
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model to over-predict in low-risk locations even when
our pgm models are able to differentiate between the
local risk levels. To counter this, we also include as a
third approach some models that are based on the
product of the predicted probabilities at the cm and
pgm levels.
Handling of missing or incomplete data
Dependent variables. In about 15% of the cases,
UCDP-GED is unable to precisely identify the location
of conflict. ViEWS has developed a method for multi-
ple imputation of imprecise conflict locations that con-
siderably improves the predictive performance of the
system. The method employs the locations of precisely
known events within the same conflict and within close
temporal proximity to determine a spatial probability
distribution of latent conflict propensity for each uncer-
tain event. See Croicu & Hegre (2018) and Appendix
F.1 for details.
Predictor variables. The methods in ViEWS require
that the input data used for the simulations and predic-
tions are complete. Dropping observations with missing
values would make it impossible to make predictions for
those observations. If the data cannot be assumed to be
missing completely at random, dropping them creates
bias in parameter estimates and standard errors of the
models (Allison, 2009), and presumably also in forecasts.
To counter this issue, we perform multiple imputation
to replace the missing data using the Amelia II package in
R (Honaker, King & Blackwell, 2011). We provide
more details in Appendix F.2.
Projections
To generate forecasts for the future, the system requires
that the input predictor matrix X ðkÞt is defined for all the
timesteps t over the forecast window. ViEWS will make
use of three strategies to project these input predictors.
The first is to use our dynamic forecasting system (see
the ‘Dynamic simulation’ section). The forecasts we gen-
erate for state-based conflict or any other endogenous
variable at t are used as projected inputs in each relevant
equation at t þ 1. A similar approach can be used for
other events. For instance, dynamic simulations of
ACLED protest events (Raleigh et al., 2010) are used
as projections in models that include protest variables.
The second is to use information from external sources.
This is often straightforward: most countries, for
instance, have scheduled dates for elections over the next
few years. We will also search for projections for other
predictors such as droughts in a given location, or
expected growth rates for a given country. The third is
to make very simple assumptions, for example that a
predictor is unchanged over the forecasting window.
This approach is the one we use for most predictors in
the system.
How well do we predict? Evaluation of models
To evaluate the out-of-sample predictive performance of
the ViEWS forecasting system, we use the ‘evaluation
periodization’ (Table IV). We evaluate by comparing
predictions based on data from the training and calibra-
tion periods with what the UCDP observed in the test-
ing period.9
Principles and metrics for model evaluation
We evaluate our models using four metrics: area under the
curve of the receiver operating characteristic (AUROC),
area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR), Brier score,
and accuracy. The AUROC and AUPR metrics range
from 0 to 1, with high values signifying good predictive
performance. AUROC is based on the ROC curve, which
plots the true positive rate10 (TPR ¼ TPTPþFN) over the true
negative rate (TNR ¼ TNFPþTN) for each possible thresh-
old.11 AUROC scores are high for models that correctly
recall a large fraction of the positives for any given level of
false alarms. AUPR is based on the PR plot, which plots
precision (Pr ¼ TPTPþFP) over recall (R ¼ TPTPþFN).12 AUPR
scores are high for models that are correct in a large frac-
tion of the positive predictions for any given level of recall
or true positive rate. The Brier score is defined as
BS ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
ðp^i  AiÞ2
where p^i is the prediction for observation i and Ai what
actually occurred. Brier scores range from 0 to 1, and
lower scores correspond to better performance. Accuracy
(A) is the proportion of cases that are correctly classified:
9 We use non-imputed data for evaluation.
10 We use the conventional notation that TN, FN, TP, FP refer to
true negatives, false negatives, true positives, and false positives,
respectively.
11 A ‘threshold’ defines a probability p over which the system yields
a positive prediction. A threshold of 0.5, for instance, means we
predict a positive if p^ > 0:5 and a negative if not. Specificity is
1 TPR, where TPR is the true positive rate.
12 Note that ‘sensitivity’, ‘true positive rate’, and ‘recall’ are
synonyms.
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A ¼ TNþTPTNþFPþFNþTP. The accuracy metric differs from the
other three in that it is defined for only a single thresh-
old. We select the threshold that minimizes the misclas-
sification costs in the calibration period of the models we
evaluate (see Appendix G for details).
We use multiple performance metrics because model
performance is multidimensional. In many model com-
parisons, one model outperforms others in terms of all
measures, so we can safely conclude on the best. In other
situations, the picture is less consistent and multiple
metrics reflect this. In particular, while the Brier score
favors sharp, accurate probabilistic predictions (near 0 or
1), the relative ordering of the forecasts are used for
AUROC and AUPR. Moreover, since the AUROC cap-
tures the trade-off between producing a large number of
true positives versus the expense of many false alarms, the
metric favors models that are good at correctly predicting
no-conflict cases. The AUPR, on the other hand, focuses
on the positive cases, since it captures the trade-off
between maximizing the proportion of positive predic-
tions that are correct versus identifying as many of the
actual conflicts as possible. Consequently, the AUPR
does not reward models that only excel at predicting
non-conflict cases. Since we are more interested in pre-
dicting instances of political violence than the absence of
such, we give priority to the AUPR over the AUROC, as
the former rewards models more for accurately predict-
ing conflict rather than non-conflict.
Overall performance
Table V shows summary statistics of the predictive per-
formance of the ViEWS forecasts for state-based conflict
at the cm level aggregated over the test period (2015–
17).13 Since the metrics introduced above depend on the
data they are applied to, they are most informative when
compared to a baseline prediction for the same forecast-
ing problem. The top line reports our metrics for the
baseline model defined above (Table II). The following
lines report the same for a set of reference models that
include an increasing number of themes from Table II.
Note that our final ensemble does not include all these
models – they are only used here to demonstrate the
relative importance of the themes.14
The second line in Table V combines the baseline and
the conflict history theme predictors. Adding conflict
history to the baseline model increases AUROC from
0.824 to 0.944, AUPR from 0.675 to 0.851, and
reduces the Brier score from 0.125 to 0.066. Accuracy
and F1 score given the optimal threshold also increases.
The three middle lines in the table show the relative
contribution of the three main cm-level themes: econom-
ics, demography, and institutions. In isolation, they have
ambiguous contributions to the baseline þ conflict his-
tory model: the precision-recall curve deteriorates for all
models, and the other metrics improve only for the
demography model.
Finally, we turn to the evaluation of the cm ensemble,
displayed in the final row in Table V. The metrics show
that the ensemble increases the predictive performance
considerably in comparison to the baseline models.
Compared to the model including the demography
theme, there is an increase in AUROC from .9448 to
.9555 and in AUPR from .838 to .869. The Brier score,
on the other hand, worsens from 0.0642 to 0.0932. This
may be because the ensemble model yields more high-
probability predictions than the simpler models, and
these are punished excessively by the Brier score.
Table V. Evaluation of constituent models and ensembles, cm level, state-based conflict, 36 months January 2015–December
2017
Model/theme combinations
Multi-threshold metrics Single-threshold metrics
AUROC Brier score AUPR Accuracy F1-score Cost-based threshold
Baseline 0:8238 0:1252 0:675 0.625 0.521 0.132
Baseline þ conflict history theme 0:9442 0:0662 0:851 0.852 0.741 0.055
Baseline þ conflict history þ economy themes 0:9266 0:0668 0:830 0.873 0.764 0.083
Baseline þ conflict history þ demography themes 0:9448 0:0642 0:838 0.803 0.690 0.090
Baseline þ conflict history þ institutions themes 0:8855 0:0680 0:778 0.929 0.844 0.724
All themes 0:9352 0:0693 0:807 0.727 0.622 0.089
Ensemble 0:9555 0:0932 0:869 0.846 0.745 0.126
13 The same evaluation metrics are reported for all constituent
models, all outcomes, and both levels of analysis in Sections G, H,
and I in the Online appendix.
14 All the reference models we report here use the dynamic
simulation approach.
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The evaluation for the pgm level is summarized in
Table VI. Adding the conflict history theme to the base-
line model represents a huge improvement in terms of
both AUROC and AUPR, but not so in terms of Brier
scores. Adding the two geographical themes improves
performance in terms of all metrics. When we add the
cm predictors to the models, the AUROC deteriorates
whereas the other two improve. This indicates that
cm-level predictors are important also at the fine-
grained geographical level, but involves a certain
‘smearing’ cost – this model simply lifts the pgm-level
probabilities up uniformly within high-risk countries,
partly ignoring the local information in the simpler
models.
The ensemble, again, performs much better than the
constituent parts across all metrics. Compared to the
conflict history model, the ensemble improves AUROC
from 0.892 to 0.948, AUPR from 0.225 to 0.277, and
Brier score from 0.00718 to 0.00623. These improve-
ments are considerable. The ensemble successfully sorts
observations into higher and lower probability and thus
improves AUROC and AUPR. At the same time, the
modest improvement in the Brier score shows that the
value of the ensemble predicted probabilities for true
positives is still quite far from 1. In other words, com-
pared to the baseline models, the ensemble is not making
sharper predictions that clearly separate the classes.
Overall, however, these evaluations show that the cur-
rent system does well relative to the baseline models. As
ViEWS moves forward, the metrics reported here for the
ensemble models will constitute the baselines for future
comparisons. These numbers also constitute a new frame
of reference for other research aiming to gauge the per-
formance of similar conflict early-warning systems.
Performance over time
The results above implicitly assume that the uncertainty
of the forecasts for 2021 is similar to those for 2018,
which may be unreasonable. Figure 4 shows how the
predictive performance of the ViEWS forecasts change
depending on how far into the future we move. As
before, forecasts for, say, January 2016 are compared
with actual outcomes in January 2016, but here we look
at the metrics computed for individual months. These
evaluations enable us to gauge the feasibility of forecast-
ing up to 36 months into the future. The top row shows
performance for the conflict outcomes at the cm level,
the bottom row the same for pgm. In the plots in the left
column, the y axis shows AUROC for each month and
the right column AUPR. Since the predictive perfor-
mance differs between the models, the y axis varies from
plot to plot. The x axis shows the month of the forecast,
moving from one to 36 months into the future. The lines
are smoothed using a loess function.15
At the cm level, both AUROC and AUPR decline
over time. As we move further into the future, it becomes
increasingly difficult to predict accurately. The deteriora-
tion is substantial, especially for AUPR. In the top left
figure, AUROC decreases from about 0.98 in the first six
months to around 0.95 in the second and third years.
Top right, we also see a decrease in AUPR. In the first six
months, AUPR is well over 0.90. In the second and third
years, it is closer to 0.80 on average. More strikingly,
AUROC and AUPR at the pgm change much less over
time. In the third year of the forecasting window, the
system still retains an AUPR at about 0.25. This is prob-
ably because of the quite static conflict picture across
Africa. In Appendix B.3 we show how persistent the
patterns have been throughout the later training and
calibration periods and up to today. The results
Table VI. Evaluation of constituent models and ensembles, pgm level, state-based conflict, 36 months January 2015–December
2017
Model/theme combinations
Multi-threshold metrics Single-threshold metrics
AUROC Brier score AUPR Accuracy F1-score Cost-based threshold
Baseline 0:6324 0:00657 0:049 0.994 0.159 0.017
Baseline þ conflict history theme 0:8920 0:00718 0:225 0.988 0.262 0.066
Baseline þ conflict history þ social
and natural geography themes
0:9225 0:00676 0:227 0.992 0.278 0.141
All themes 0:9125 0:00650 0:245 0.990 0.254 0.110
Ensemble 0:9484 0:00623 0:277 0.991 0.289 0.064
15 If the figures were plotted without smoothing, we would see a zig-
zag pattern reflecting that we use short time windows in the
evaluation (month) and that the incidence of conflict in each
month fluctuates more than our forecasted risk.
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consolidate our expectation that the ViEWS forecasts
perform better in the near than the distant future, but
that forecasting over a three-year horizon is fully within
reach. This evaluation also sets the standard against
which ViEWS will improve performance.
Current forecasts
Here, we present the ViEWS forecasts as of 1 October
2018. These are the first set of results using the model
setup described in the previous sections. Since June
2018, we have published updated forecasts for the com-
ing 36 months at http://views.pcr.uu.se/ and are con-
tinuously updating.16
State-based conflict sb
Figure 5 shows the current ensemble forecasts for sb
conflict – based on our cm-level (left) and pgm-level
ensembles (right). They show the forecasts for the imme-
diate future – what will happen in October 2018? Since
our ensembles aggregate the constituent models, they
closely reflect the insights drawn above from Figures 2
and 3. At the cm level (left figure), our results are in line
with mainstream studies. For instance, we forecast a high
probability of sb conflict in countries with large popula-
tions (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Raleigh &Hegre, 2009), in
non-democracies and countries with recent regime change
(Hegre et al., 2001; Cederman, Hug & Krebs, 2010),
with low or negative growth rates (Collier & Hoeffler,
2004), and with low education levels (Thyne, 2006) or
other indicators of low socio-economic development.
Comparing Figure 5 with the observed conflict history
reproduced inAppendix B.2, it is clear how a recent history
of conflict translates into a high probability of conflict. In
Mali, Nigeria, and DR Congo conflict is almost certain.
We also forecast a high probability of state-based conflict
(sb) in south-west Cameroon, driven by recent events.
Tensions and violence have escalated since separatists sym-
bolically declared independence of ‘Ambazonia’ inOctober
2017. The separatist violence, involving several groups,
continued in 2018 (CrisisWatch, 2018a). There have also
been clashes between government forces and IS/Boko
Haram in the northern part of the country.17
Figure 4. Performance for model ensembles over time, cm (top) and pgm (bottom)
AUROC (left) and AUPR (right), by month in forecasting window.
16 The procedure in practice also involves creating a ‘now-cast’ for
one month to accommodate for the time it takes the UCDP to
finalize its monthly coding and for ViEWS to prepare other input
variables. What we report here involves a now-cast for September
2018. 17 See http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/12422.
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The rightmost map in Figure 5 shows ViEWS fore-
casts for statebased conflict at the pgm level. The color
mapping is the same as for the cm forecasts. The densest
risk clusters for state-based conflict are in northern
Nigeria, the Kivu provinces in DRC, Somalia, and Dar-
fur. All of these regions have been ravaged with violence
for years. These maps reflect that countries’ recent con-
flict history is the strongest predictor of future violence.
The 2017 re-activation of armed conflict between the
government and Renamo de-escalated markedly as talks
moved forward during the spring and summer of
2018 (Crisis Watch, 2018b). At the same time, we
also see a surge in conflict in the north east where
government forces clashed with suspected Islamist
militants during the summer of 2018. The militants
also increased their attacks against civilians during the
summer (allAfrica, 2018).
Beyond history, our natural and social geography fea-
tures are also important. The low population concentra-
tion in Sahara translates into a low risk of conflict, and
conflicts are more likely in border regions than close to
countries’ capitals. The maps also show how country-
level risk assessments influence the geographical fore-
casts. Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, for instance,
have markedly lower probability of future conflict than
neighboring countries.
All forecasts shown so far have been for October 2018,
the second month after the most recent data available.
Figure 6 indicates how the forecasts change over time.
The color mapping is roughly the same as above, but here
corresponds to the forecasted proportion of PRIO-GRID
cells in sb conflict for each country. In Burundi, for
instance, we expect about 18% of the cells to have conflict
in each month. In Ethiopia, the forecast is 1.2%.
Our models reflect that forecasted violence in these
clusters change little over time – most countries have the
same color throughout the period.18 This reflects that
our projections for the exogenous variables change little,
which may artificially inflate the impression of constant
future conflict. But the predicted persistence is also
reflecting patterns that are very real. The ViEWS models
contain information about conflict events many years
into the past, and the underlying estimates indicate that
African conflicts in general are very persistent (see
Appendix B.3). Consequently, most of the variation
in Figure 6 is between countries, not across time, and
there is only a very slight tendency of a ‘regression to
the mean’.
There are a couple of exceptions to this static picture.
For example, compared to our forecasts a few months
ago, we now predict a lower danger of conflict in Togo as
the impact of violent events in 2017 recedes (Zodzi,
2017). On the other hand, there is an increasing danger
of conflict in DRC and Burundi spilling over into
Rwanda. The forecasted proportion of pgms with conflict
in Rwanda increases from 0.063 in October 2018 to
0.112 in late 2021.19
Figure 5. ViEWS forecasts for state-based conflict, October 2018
Country-level (left) and PRIO-GRID-level (right). Predicted probabilities of at least one UCDP-GED event, based on the ViEWS system as of
1 October 2018.
18 See Appendix J for zoom-in maps that show this persistence for
Western Central Africa.
19 See Table 25, Appendix J for simulated proportions of cells with
conflict for all countries in Africa.
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The other two types of outcomes
Figure 7 shows the forecast maps for non-state con-
flict (ns) and one-sided violence (os). These follow
partly the same patterns as sb. Our forecast for ns
depends on the same factors as for sb, but seems less
suppressed by democratic institutions and socio-
economic development than sb events. More impor-
tantly, the patterns of past events differ across conflict
types (see figures in Appendix B.2). Cameroon and
Egypt, for instance, have not had much ns conflict,
whereas Libya has seen a lot. We forecast a high
probability also of ns in Kenya due to recent con-
frontations between cattle rustlers and herders.
The forecasts for os respond to about the same factors,
but are less clearly related to protests and regime change.
They also occur more frequently in newly independent
countries. Kenya, again, will see continued one-sided
violence, most likely perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab.20
At the geographical level, the forecasts for non-state con-
flict and one-sided violence depend on the same factors
although with somewhat different implications. For ns,
we forecast main clusters in central Nigeria, Central
African Republic, North Kivu, Darfur, and the Kenyan
Figure 7. ViEWS forecasts, non-state conflict (left) and one-sided violence (right)
Predicted probabilities of at least one UCDP-GED event for October 2018, based on the ViEWS system as of 1 October 2018.
Figure 6. Forecasted proportion of pgm cells with conflict events, by country, September/October 2018–October 2021
20 See http://ucdp.uu.se/#/onesided/1071.
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Rift Valley. For os, northern Nigeria, Darfur, North
Kivu, and Burundi are the primary hotspots.
Conclusions
This article has presented initial results from the ViEWS
forecasting system and summarized the methodology
behind these forecasts. We have accounted for the eva-
luation procedures of ViEWS and established a frame of
reference and a baseline that we can compare future
extensions to. The evaluation indicates that the system
generates very accurate forecasts for conflict-prone
regions in Africa.
ViEWS is being developed according to four guiding
principles: public availability, uniform coverage, trans-
parency, and methodological innovation. Public avail-
ability is ensured by the complete release of all data and
procedures on the ViEWS website. This means that
ViEWS is restricted to using data that are publicly
available, even if predictive performance could be
improved by the inclusion of other data. ViEWS safe-
guards uniform coverage by relying on the UCDP suite
of datasets, which consistently applies a clearly articu-
lated definition and procedures that minimize the risk
of overseeing conflict.
Transparency and replicability are essential objectives
for ViEWS. They are also challenging given the com-
plexity of the system. The system is primarily documen-
ted in this article and the accompanying Online
appendix. Interested readers can find additional details
and updates to the system in auxiliary documentation
available on our website. The ViEWS source code is
available at https://github.com/UppsalaConflictDataPro
gram/OpenViEWS. The ViEWS team welcomes any
interested party to use the replication material and com-
pare it to their own forecasts.
As we continue to develop ViEWS, we will follow the
guidelines of Colaresi & Mahmood (2017), iteratively
evaluate the current system, and use this to inform the
next generation. We will work to strengthen the ‘early-
warning’ component by defining a useful definition of
‘onset’ and partially optimize the system for forecasting
such onsets, add assessments of the likely severity of the
violence, introduce actors as units of analysis, solicit
qualititative input from country experts, and add more
predictors that we find can strengthen the forecasting
performance.21 To document this, we are making
change logs avaliable at https://github.com/UppsalaCon
flictDataProgram/OpenViEWS/blob/master/CHANGE
LOG.md.
How useful is the current system? Currently, the main
strength of ViEWS is not its ability to forecast entirely
new conflicts. Still, the system models geographical dif-
fusion quite well. Because of its vicinity to the various
conflicts in Nigeria, the recent tensions in Cameroon are
reflected as a high predicted probability of further vio-
lence. Moreover, the models show how persistent orga-
nized violence is in Africa. Our results indicate that the
major conflict clusters in Africa will continue to be very
violent over the coming three-year period.
Many governments have their own intelligence sys-
tems upon which they act in response to threats of orga-
nized violence. Such intelligence is never publicly
available. If an open-source early-warning system such
as ViEWS can be made sufficiently accurate, critical
voices may in some cases use this to challenge the
assessments government actions are based on. Moreover,
outside observers that lack such inside information may
use high-quality forecasts to closely monitor a situation,
engage in public debate around the risks involved, and
possibly take action. NGOs can apply pressure on con-
flict actors or prepare for humanitarian assistance. Large
organizations such as the UNmay use the forecasts when
they decide on whether to deploy peacekeeping opera-
tions (Hegre, Hultman & Nygård, 2019).
Can the system be misused? A government that sees
our risk assessment for a location inside the territory it
governs might conceivably be led to violently pre-empt
the conflict. We do not believe this is a great danger.
Local governments have much better information about
what is going on than any system based on open-source
data can deliver.
ViEWS is currently restricted to Africa, and all models
have been trained on Africa-only data. We believe the
system can easily be scaled up to global coverage. Most of
the results for the country-level thematic models are
consistent with previous research done with global data.
Some of the geographical features, on the other hand
(e.g. distance to diamond deposits), are more specific
to Africa. Our intuition is that most of the models spec-
ified here translate well outside Africa, but such an exten-
sion would probably accentuate the need for more
context-sensitive models (e.g. random-slope models).
We have, for instance, noted the very persistent and
localized conflict patterns in Africa. Other regions may
display other patterns, and a global ViEWS would prob-
ably benefit from modeling them as conditional either
on the regions they take place in or some predictor that
affects the dynamics (e.g. general income levels).21 See Appendix L for some more details on the planned extensions.
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We see ViEWS as a step towards a future where high-
resolution forecasts of conflict at practically useful spatial
and temporal scales are publicly available. While any
such system for violence will necessarily be less precise
than those for physical systems, the goal is to improve
outcomes relative to a world where these forecasts do not
exist. Even an imperfect future system has the potential
to inform the placement of peacekeepers, the deploy-
ment of NGO resources, and even the decisions of pri-
vate citizens. Making it more difficult to hide behind a
cover of ignorance may potentially save lives. Attaining
this goal will take a community of researchers collabor-
ating across domain specialties to identify mistakes, sug-
gest innovations, and incorporate successful new ideas
into a computational infrastructure. We believe ViEWS
is a start towards bringing this vision to fruition.
Replication data and source code
Replication data, the Online appendix, and datasets with
detailed predictions are available at http://views.pcr.uu.
se/downloads/. Full source code is available at https://
github.com/UppsalaConflictDataProgram/
OpenViEWS.
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